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Network profile

Ratatoskr RATR

Ratatoskr (RATR) network profile on Nodes24. The network currently reports 199 active supported nodes. Observed chain height is 187,940. Nodes24 supports Masternode and Evo node deployment.

Masternode Evo node 1.0.6
Current price $0.00009832 +2.95% 24h Market snapshot 2026-10-16
Market & supply

RATR market overview

Market cap—
24h volume—
24h high$0.00009832
24h low$0.00009832
Circulating supply— RATR
Total supply— RATR
Max supply— RATR
Live network

RATR network status

15 / 15 Nodes24 nodes synced
Block height187,940
Blocks / day1,366
Block time1.0542 min
All nodes223
Active nodes199
Masternode active / all141 / 164
Evo node active / all58 / 59
Hashing algorithmyespower
Deployed release1.0.6
Nodes24 hosting

Available RATR node types

Collateral, estimated rewards and deployment options in one place.

RATR node

Masternode

IPV4
Collateral7,500 RATR
Collateral value$0.7374
Active / all network nodes141 / 164
Node reward / block3.75 RATR
Est. daily reward13.7332 RATR≈ $0.00135025
Est. monthly reward$0.040508
Est. yearly reward$0.492842
Est. annual ROI66.84%
Hosting / month$1.75
RATR node

Evo node

IPV4
Collateral30,000 RATR
Collateral value$2.9496
Active / all network nodes58 / 59
Node reward / block15 RATR
Est. daily reward54.933 RATR≈ $0.00540101
Est. monthly reward$0.16203
Est. yearly reward$1.9714
Est. annual ROI66.84%
Hosting / month$1.75

Estimated rewards and ROI are calculated from the latest available network statistics and may change as network participation, block rewards or market price change.

History

RATR market history

RATR price history
RATR volume history
Market data supplied by Ratatoskr
Project

About Ratatoskr (RATR)

Ratatoskr (RATR) is a small, opinionated yespower proof-of-work cryptocurrency with deterministic masternodes, a consensus-enforced per-block treasury drip, bounded governance, and a native bridge to Alephium. It builds on the Dash Core code lineage, with tokenomics deliberately rebalanced around two lessons from prior masternode-coin failures: miners must remain profitable for the network to stay secure, and governance must not be able to extract value from the people securing the network. Neither is aspirational here; both are enforced in consensus through hard-coded reward floors, capped governance velocity, and a permanently-funded treasury that drips block by block rather than accumulating into votable superblock payouts.

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